The first decisive blow fell on the testing end. Organized by the NDCA, disease control departments nationwide conducted comprehensive sampling of all 168 domestic baby diaper manufacturers, covering 180 brands and 368 batches of finished products. Testing was entrusted to authoritative institutions such as the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) and the China Academy of Inspection and Quarantine. Additionally, 32 batches of component-specific samples from key areas like waistbands and adhesive tabs were tested. On-site supervisory inspections further corroborated that the inspected enterprises complied with hygiene standards for disinfectant product manufacturers, with no evidence of formamide addition or presence in production processes or raw materials.
The test results from self-media were systematically replicated and refuted. The investigation team seized the remaining diaper samples from the Xiaohongshu account "Kao Pu Lao Wang" (Reliable Old Wang) for retesting; none of the 58 batches across 15 brands tested positive for formamide. When experts replicated the blogger's testing process, they found that the methodology lacked rigorous validation, and failed to assess deviations between mass-to-charge ratio data and the exact mass of formamide, rendering the positive claims unsubstantiated.
The claim of "formamide detected in blood" was the true catalyst for the escalation of public sentiment. Verification revealed that the blood formamide testing conducted by the Mass Spectrometry Research and Clinical Application Center of the Shandong Public Health Clinical Center began in June 2026 and was still in a preliminary research stage. The center's director, Yu, and assistant, Li, both admitted that the testing method was not yet fully developed. Expert review identified multiple issues, including identical signals in blank matrix controls, signal-to-noise ratios failing to meet the basic requirements for qualitative analysis, arbitrary selection of data points, and deletion of raw data. The consensus was that the testing process was unreliable and the conclusions were untrustworthy.
The definitive evidence came from retesting. The 210 sealed blood samples were transported back to Beijing, where academicians and experts from the National Center for Clinical Laboratories under the NHC, China CDC, the First Hospital of China Medical University, and Peking Union Medical College Hospital repeatedly deliberated to establish a testing methodology and conducted parallel retests. Formamide was not detected in any of the samples. Prior to this, there had been no published reports on blood formamide testing methodologies either domestically or internationally.
Third-party testing agencies were also criticized. Hefei Guangce delegated a testing task beyond its capabilities to Suzhou Puze. Experts determined that the latter failed to conduct blank and parallel sample testing, did not compare retention times with standard substances, and achieved a spectral match of only 7%. Furthermore, two leaked report screenshots from Lianxin Testing (Jiangsu) dated June 25, showing detected values of 414 mg/kg and 384 mg/kg, were actually electronic drafts under review. The final audit determined no detection, and the agency publicly declared the drafts invalid.
Accountability Roster: Situation Report by the Shandong Provincial Health Commission
Yu (Derivative Name): Medical practice license revoked; banned from medical clinical research for five years; demoted from Deputy Chief Physician (Grade 7) to Attending Physician (Grade 9); placed on one-year probation within the Party; removed from the specially appointed director position.
Zhang (Fa), Party Committee Secretary: Admonished.
Liu (Ming), Deputy Party Secretary & Director: Received criticism and education.
Su, Party Committee Member & Deputy Director: Issued a warning within the Party.
Wang, Deputy Director of the Science and Education Department: Issued a formal warning.
Zhu (Hua), Section Chief of the Scientific Research Section: Issued a serious warning within the Party and removed from current post.
Institutional Level: The Party Committee was ordered to submit a written self-examination. The incident will be linked to annual commendations, evaluations, and appraisals, resulting in a reduction of quotas and a downgrade in ratings.
The true lesson of this (storm/controversy) lies not in the word "formamide," but in the threshold for testing. A single test, lacking method validation, blank samples, and parallel samples, amplified by short-video platforms, can shatter years of accumulated trust in a category within 72 hours. Rebuilding that trust took 119 days, 400 batches of sampling, and customer service costs numbering in the millions for two leading brands.
Front-loading Risk Management: Shifting from "passive response" to "normalized internal control" by incorporating the screening of 292 or even over 1,000 risk substances into corporate self-inspection systems.
Urgent Need for Methodological Standardization: The industry must establish authoritative, reproducible testing standards to avoid the public opinion dilemma of "anyone can test, and whoever dares to speak holds the moral high ground."
Transparency as a Moat: Traceability codes, live-streamed production lines, and open factory tours-actions that may seem like marketing-are essentially pre-storing trust for future public opinion crises.
It must be clearly understood that while the official conclusion answered "whether it exists," it has not ended public scrutiny regarding the safety of baby products. Stricter regulation, higher standards, and greater information transparency are the long-term variables this incident leaves for the industry.